This paper argues that lexical and operator-based analyses of distributivity are not in conflict, but are both necessary components of any theory of distributivity that aims to account for all the relevant data. I use several contrasts between plural definites and group NPs to show that we need an operator-based analysis of distributivity; this kind of distributivity is available with plural definites but not with group subjects, which can be explained under the common assumption that group NPs denote atoms rather (...) than sums and hence do not allow quantification over their individual parts. At the same time, we need a lexical theory of distributivity to account for the various distributive interpretations that we do find with groups; a formalisation of such a theory is outlined in the final section of this paper. (shrink)

_Ordo II_ comprises the work that made Erasmus famous, namely the _Adagia_ some of which were extended into essays. This first volume of the _Adages_ in the Amsterdam edition of the Latin texts of Erasmus gives a general introduction to the _Adages_ in German, as well as a critical edition of the Latin text of the first half of the first thousand _Adages_.

In a post-truth era, taking seriously the assertions of political figures and what other people say on the internet strikes many as irrational and gullible. Let us call this reaction the “incredulous reaction.” In this paper, I consider a common response to the targets of the incredulous reaction: excluding them from activities like debate and discounting their beliefs as relevant to our own. This exclusion is motivated by the assumption that those who continue to place epistemic trust in a post-truth (...) society are acting irrationally. I begin with an argument that we can justifiably exclude irrational persons from our epistemic activities. I then present a conflict that emerges when we take the wellbeing of our epistemic community to be an end in and of itself, and not merely a means for pursuing other epistemic goods. I propose that healthy epistemic communities depend on networks of epistemic trust and on ensuring their members are treated with the epistemic respect they deserve. If we were to adopt the development of a healthy epistemic community as a goal, then excluding others may no longer be a justifiable choice. (shrink)

In his paper, “Aesthetic Terms, Metaphor and the Nature of Aesthetic Properties”, Rafael De Clercq claims to offer a category-based explanation of the metaphorical uninterpretability of aesthetic terms, and establish that the concept of an aesthetic property is fully analyzable in non-aesthetic terms. Both would be interesting and noteworthy achievements if accomplished. However, I argue in this discussion piece that he fails to achieve either goal.

In the 2020 Yale Law Journal article, “Commonsense Consent,” Roseanna Sommers argues that deception is compatible with the layperson’s intuitive sense of consent. That is, unlike the canonical understanding of consent defended by legal scholars and philosophers, the notion of consent defended by the folk is not invalidated by deception. In this study, I find that while respondents do appear to attribute consent to victims of deception, they do so in a limited number of contexts – i.e., they attribute de (...) re consent to victims of de dicto deception and attribute de dicto consent to victims of de re deception. When the two varieties of consent and deception are properly disambiguated and matched type for type however, we see the reverse phenomenon – i.e., participants refrain from attributing de dicto consent to de dicto deception and refrain from attributing de re consent to de re deception. If this is right, rather than saying, as Sommers does, that deception generally fails to invalidate commonsense consent, we should refine our understanding of commonsense consent to include two varieties of consent, each of which is in fact invalidated by its own variety of deception. (shrink)

Artykuł dotyczy odkrycia nestoriańskiej steli w Xi’an, dawnej stolicy Państwa Środka, wzniesionej w 781, a odkrytej w 1625 r. Znalezisko przyciągnęło bardzo szybko uwagę niektórych pracujących w Chinach misjonarzy jezuickich, którzy zarówno badali stelę na miejscu, jak i opisali jej treść w raportach do generała zakonu. Zajmowali się nią również autorzy pierwszych monografii poświęconych historii misji Towarzystwa Jezusowego w Chinach, takich jak Álvaro de Semedo, Michał Boym, Athanasius Kircher. Stela stanowiła ważne narzędzie ewangelizacyjne, gdyż dobrze wpisywała się w tradycyjne wartości (...) kultury chińskiej, do których należał szacunek do ciągłości historycznej i konserwatyzmu. Tomasz Szpot Dunin wskazuje na potrójne znaczenie odkrycia. Po pierwsze, jej obecność wskazywała, iż wiara chrześcijańska była starożytną religią stojącą na równi z tradycyjnymi chińskimi religiami, takimi jak taoizm, buddyzm, konfucjanizm. Po drugie, zachowana inskrypcja podkreślała monoteizm religii chrześcijańskiej, co wpisywało się w działalność misyjną jezuitów, którzy, jak Matteo Ricci, próbowali udowodnić Chińczykom, że w zamierzchłych czasach byli oni monoteistami. Po trzecie, odnalezienie płyty przyczyniło się do sukcesu misyjnego w samej prowincji Shaanxi. (shrink)

Contrary to the belief of most Kantians and Kant scholars, Kant is in fact an anarchist. In this paper, I distinguish sharply between two concepts of enlightenment, enlightenment lite and heavy duty or radical enlightement ; show how there is an unbridgeable gap between Kant’s official political theory in The Doctrine of Right and his ethics; show how Kant’s real political theory is worked out in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, and is in fact a heavy-duty, radically enlightened (...) version of anarchism; refute and debunk widely-believed Hobbesian assumptions about human nature, which are in fact nothing but cognitive illusions; and propose a de-biasing strategy in political aesthetics for ridding ourselves of these Hobbesian cognitive illusions. (shrink)

Es ist nicht immer so klar, welche Verantwortlichkeiten zum Klimaschutz den einzelnen Bürger:innen legitimerweise auferlegt werden können. Viele Forderungen scheinen leicht zu bewerkstelligen – z. B. die Umstellung der Essensgewohnheiten –, manche überfordern – z. B. die Wahl angemessener Ausnahmen – und wieder andere – z. B. die technische Entfernung von Klimagasen aus der Atmosphäre – sind ohne staatliche Unterstützung nicht zu bewerkstelligen. In diesem Aufsatz entwickeln wir ein Modell zur Unterscheidung zwischen den individuellen Klimaschutzverantwortlichkeiten und den Verantwortlichkeiten des Staates, (...) wenn dieser netto null Emissionen anstrebt. Hierzu unterscheiden wir drei Emissionsniveaus: i.) die aktuell hohen Emissionen innerhalb eines Staates, ii.) die Emissionen, die Bürger:innen aktuell zur gleichberechtigten Teilhabe an einer Gesellschaft benötigen, iii.) die ohne technische Hilfsmittel nicht vermeidbaren Emissionen. Wir argumentieren, dass die einzelnen Bürger:innen ohne staatliche Unterstützung nur für die Reduktion ihrer aktuell hohen Emissionen verantwortlich gemacht werden können. Mit Blick auf alle anderen Emissionen kommt ihnen in erster Linie eine politische Verantwortung zu. (shrink)

The doctrine of Kantian natural piety says that rational human animals are essentially at home in physical nature. In this essay, I apply the doctrine of Kantian natural piety directly to the natural sciences, and especially physics, by showing how they have a cognitive, epistemic, metaphysical, practical/moral, aesthetic/artistic, religious, and sociocultural/political grounding in Kantian sensibility, both pure and empirical. This is what I call Kantian scientific pietism, and it is to be directly and radically opposed to scientific naturalism.

Over 25 years ago, the first author conjectured in [15] that the existence of arbitrarily large primes is provable from the axioms I Δ₀(π) + def(π), where π(x) is the number of primes not exceeding x, IΔ₀(π) denotes the theory of Δ₀ induction for the language of arithmetic including the new function symbol π, and de f(π) is an axiom expressing the usual recursive definition of π. We prove a modified version in which π is replaced by a more general (...) function ξ that counts some of the primes below x (which primes depends on the values of parameters in ξ), and has the property that π is provably Δ₀(ξ) definable. (shrink)

Actualmente, la reflexión sobre la imagen se centra mayoritariamente sobre su masiva presencia y su interminable reproducción. En este trabajo nos centraremos, a la inversa, en cómo las imágenes se destruyen masiva y sistemáticamente. Si el examen interdisciplinar es una prerrogativa fundamental en los estudios visuales, el volumen Striking Images, Iconoclasms Past and Present (Ashgate 2013), compilado por excelentes históricos y arqueólogos, ofrece a los filósofos un modelo importante de colaboración a la hora de pensar qué son las imágenes. El (...) propósito de este trabajo es presentar y discutir brevemente algunos aspectos originales de estos ensayos, enfatizando la importancia de los distintos modos y motivos por los que nuestros antepasados no solo han creado, sino también han destruido imágenes. Distinguiendo la iconoclasia del simple vandalismo, podemos descubrir una ambigüedad fundamental según la cual quien intenta preservar las imágenes, acaba con destruirlas y quien aparece como destros antepasados no solo han tructor, logra fertilizar nuevas concepciones y significados para su propia tradición figurativa. Quizás esta ambigüedad no sea algo que las imágenes sufren desde fuera, sino que sea algo connatural a la imagen misma. Y si es así, quien hoy estudia la vida de las imágenes, quizás podría encontrar un acceso privilegiado en esa a través una lógica paradójica que destaca como las imágenes mueren. PALABRAS CLAVESICONOCLASIA, ICONOFÍLIA, FILOSOFÍA Y TEORÍA DE LAS IMÁGENES, ESTUDIOS VISUALES.ABSTRACTContemporary thought on images focuses mostly on their massive presence and their endless reproduction. On the contrary, in this paper, I will focus on how images have been massively and systematically destroyed. If the interdisciplinary exam is a fundamental prerogative in visual studies, the volume Striking Images, Iconoclasms Past and Present (Ashgate 2013), compiled by excellent historians and archaeologists, could offer to philosophers an important frame of teamwork in thinking what the images are. The purpose of this paper is to present and discuss briefly some original aspects of these essays, by emphasizing the importance of means and reasons through which our ancestors have not only created, but also destroyed images. Once distinguished iconoclasm and mere vandalism, we could discover a fundamental ambiguity whereby any person who tries to preserve the images, finishes with wrecking them; while on the contrary somebody who appears as a destroyer, succeeds to fertilize new concepts and meanings for his/her own figurative tradition. Perhaps this ambiguity is not something that image suffers extrinsically, but something inherent to the image itself. And if it is so, he/she who wants to study the life of images, could perhaps find a privileged access to it, through a paradoxical logic that explains, instead, how images die.KEYWORDSICONOCLASM, ICONOPHILIA, PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY OF IMAGES, VISUAL STUDIES. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In Kant’s Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth CenturyRobert HannaTom Rockmore. In Kant’s Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. Pp. 213. Paper, $24.95.In In Kant's Wake, Tom Rockmore sets himself the almost impossibly ambitious task of telling a coherent story about the sprawling set of thinkers, doctrines, arguments, journal articles, books, social institutions, teachings, and other intellectual practices that make up philosophy in the twentieth century. (...) His highly plausible unifying hypothesis is that twentieth-century philosophy is a series of creative and reactive footnotes to Kant's Critical Philosophy as encapsulated in the Critique of Pure Reason, and in particular, to Kant's transcendental idealism. Of course the same unifying hypothesis is equally plausible of the nineteenth century. In this sense, the history of philosophy since Kant is just the history of post-Kantian philosophy.Rather than telling a single long story, Rockmore tells five shorter stories. He begins his narrative with a chapter on Kant's metaphysics and immediate responses to the Critique of Pure Reason (ch. 2). Then he focuses, in turn, on the diachronic developments of Marxism (ch. 3), pragmatism, (ch. 4), phenomenology (ch. 5), and analytic philosophy (ch. 6). The five stories are framed by a methodological chapter on the problem of interpreting twentieth-century philosophy (ch. 1), and a concluding chapter on the relation between Kant and the overall shape of philosophy in the twentieth century (ch. 7).Three more or less explicitly-stated interpretive principles run through each of Rockmore's historical narratives. The first, as I have already mentioned, is the grand unifying hypothesis of the essentially protean character of Kant's first Critique and the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. The second is that each distinct philosophical movement is [End Page 676] fundamentally organized around the teachings and writings of a few "master" or "strong" thinkers (14). And the third is that the history of philosophy is nothing but a multi-voiced Socratic conversation (13). Everyone knows how even the most intensely animated intellectual conversation can end with an inconclusive whimper instead of a conclusive bang. According to Rockmore, that is basically what happened to the great philosophical conversation of the twentieth century.In the chapter on Kant, Rockmore usefully distinguishes between two strands of transcendental idealism that Kant regarded as fully complementary, but which tended to run and pull in sharply opposite directions in post-Kantian philosophy: (1) the representationalist strand, and (2) the constructivist strand (36). Now Kant's transcendental idealism says four things. First, cognition is the mental representation of objects. Second, the objects we cognize are nothing but appearances or phenomena and never things-in-themselves or noumena. Third, the generic structure of the objects and the world we cognize is identical to the non-empirical or a priori generic structure of the innate cognitive capacities or faculties of our minds. And fourth, the human mind is spontaneously active in producing the specific structures of the very objects we cognize when our faculties are triggered by particular sensory inputs. The first and second theses of transcendental idealism constitute its representationalist strand, and the third and fourth theses constitute its constructivist strand.The decomposition of the orginal Kantian vector into its representationalist and constructivist components helps Rockmore in his interpretation of the four main sub-movements of twentieth-century philosophy. Marxism or dialectical materialism, organized of course around the teachings and writings of Karl Marx, is an economic, social, and political version of post-Kantian constructivism focused on the concrete struggles of alienated individuals and groups to achieve liberation and self-realization in collective action. So too pragmatism, organized around the teachings and writings of C. S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, is another version of post-Kantian constructivism, this time focused on the idea that the meaning and truth of concepts and propositions is strictly determined by the practical pay-offs of applying those concepts and propositions.By contrast, phenomenology and analytic philosophy are both versions of representationalism. Phenomenology is organized around the teaching and writings of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and focuses on the structures of consciousness and object-directedness... (shrink)

Two events, apparently distant one from the other and without any direct link between them, but nevertheless strictly connected by a common spiritual legacy, constitute the subject of this paper. The first one, took place in 1971, when a very special «ecumenical chapel» opened its doors to the public. It is known under the name of «Rothko Chapel», due to the general project, undertaken by the painter Mark Rothko. Since that time, it has become one of the most precious artworks (...) that represent the contemporary religious aesthetics. The black Rothko’s paintings, the Greek-cross building designed by the architect Philip Johnson, the Broken Obelisk of the artist Barnett Newman standing right out of the Chapel and the music composed for this ambient by the composer Morton Feldman, have replaced what traditionally has been called an «imago templi»; but contrary to all Christian tradition they represent (literally) no-thing. The second event, took place in 1795, when two young friends, Hegel and Schelling, were making a kind of oath under the sign of an Invisible Church, actualizing an ambiguous concept that, even if rooted in the Holy Scriptures, it had been condemned for its consequences as heretical. The relationship between these two events is given by contemporary art historians which have established that modern abstract painting, from a formal point of view, is rooted in the Romantic tradition. With this paper I would like to contribute to the establishment of this connection, not only by formal means, but by showing a common spiritual attitude towards images. Christianity, essentially figurative in its religious aesthetics, has always had to deal with the Jewish prohibition of image-making. This difficulty has been inherited to contemporary debates in which artist with classical readings and education, often of Jewish origins but active in Christian societies, try to create a new kind of art, above all traditions and free of dogmas. According to my suggestion, Rothko Chapel should be considered as the realization of a fragile balance in which both «aniconism» and «need of images» have simultaneously sublated their one-sidedness, producing a higher spiritual stage. Thus, such a chapel would not be a simple space where all religions could only meet and undertake a dialog, but should be considered as something more surprising: a unique realization of what logically appears as a pure contradiction: the realization of an Imago Templi for an Invisible Church. (shrink)

A very special kind of feast belongs to the Christian Orthodox tradition: there is a specific liturgical celebration of the Images in the so-called Sunday of Orthodoxy. While in many cultures images are employed in order to celebrate an historic event, this is the only feast in which, on the contrary, images are celebrated for themselves. Nonetheless, the role of images in Orthodoxy is not univocally and positively accepted. In fact, the title’s expression.the wolf as a shepherd. belongs to a (...) Desert Father and refers to the role of images in our mental life. This is not reported by a heretical iconoclastic document, but by the well-known Philokalia, a kind of handbook of Orthodox Aesthetics. This paper aims to present these two aspects in their paradoxical partnership. First, I will present some historical, symbolic and liturgical aspects of this feast. Thus, we should be able to understand better why many contemporary authors claimed that the origins of our visual culture can be traced in this Feast. However, if we comprehend the philosophical value of Byzantine icons, we realise that they have little to do with our contemporary images, no matter whether we mean artistic, religious or media images. We often talk about the.power of images., but just to blame them -as if they were autonomous entities- or to praise them, in a generalized aestheticization of contemporary life. Iconophobia and iconodoulia, I claim, are emerging as ontologically impoverished versions of the former Byzantine theoretical models. What falls into oblivion is the paradoxical status of the image as.appearance of the essence of Being. that demands as a condition of its own existence its self-sublation. These dialectics, conceptually inspired by the Hegelian logic, are fully present in Byzantine Aesthetics, where the feast is considered as a precarious image, held in memory of a future image-loss event known as eschaton. (shrink)

Dans l'immense correspondance de Leibniz son échange épistolaire avec Goldbach occupe une certaine place. 4 lettres de Leibniz à Goldbach ont été publiées à son temps par Ch.G.W. Kortholt dans les deux premiers volumes de Leibnitii Epistolae ad diversos (t. I-IV, Lipsiae, 1734-1742) et rééditées par L. Dutens (Leibniz: Opera omnia, t. 3 et 5, Genevae, 1768). Récemment on a découvert 6 lettres de Goldbach à Leibniz conservées aux Archives Centrales d'Etat des Actes Anciens (= ACAA) à Moscou et encore (...) un extrait de lettre de Leibniz à Goldbach à Hannover. Cela fait, pris ensemble, une jolie collection de 11 lettres dont la traduction russe fut publiée en 1983. Nous en présentons maintenant le texte original latin avec une brève introduction et des notes. Une lettre, comme on va voir, y manque. (shrink)

In this critical review of Robert Hanna's ingenious book (2006), I aim to support Hanna‟s main insightful reading of Kant, namely what he calls “a priori truth with a human face," without appealing to Kant's divide between a priori and a posteriori and analytic and synthetic truths. My suggestion is that transcendental propositions are necessary neither in the usual epistemological sense that analytic propositions are, let alone in the metaphysical sense that some empirical propositions are. Instead, they are (...) necessary in the theoretical domain in the weak alternative sense that they make possible the empirical recognition of appearances as an object as an indispensable condition of our self-consciousness experience, and they are a priori in the practical domain in the sense that their truth is vital for our self-comprehension as human beings. (shrink)

This book includes a study of writers on mysticism, mystics and mysticism for world religions and the nature and stages of the mystical journey. This contents show some of the mystic studied - I. Mystics of The Ancient Past -/- Pre-history Of Mysticism Vedic Hymnists Early Egyptians The Early Jews Upanishadic Seers Kapila The Bhagavad Gita The Taoist Sages The Buddha -/- II. Mystics of The Greco-Roman Era -/- The Pre-Socratic Greeks Socrates And His Successors Zeno of Citium Philo Judaeus (...) Jesus of Nazareth Early Christians The Gnostics The Hermetics Plotinus III. Mystics of The Early Middle Ages -/- Pseudo-Dionysius Narada Patanjali The Tantra Shankara Dattatreya Milarepa The Ch’an And Zen Buddhists The Sufis Al-Hallaj -/- IV. Mystics of The Late Middle Ages -/- Jewish Mysticism Ibn Arabi Iraqi Rumi Jnaneshvar Medieval Christians Meister Eckhart Thomas á Kempis -/- V. Mystics of The Modern Era -/- Nicholas of Cusa Juan de la Cruz (St. John of the Cross) Kabir Nanak Dadu Seventeenth And Eighteenth Century Mystics Sri Ramakrishna Ramana Maharshi Swami Rama Tirtha Twentieth Century Mystics Conclusion . (shrink)

The concept of “harm” is ubiquitous in moral theorising, and yet remains poorly defined. Bradley suggests that the counterfactual comparative account of harm is the most plausible account currently available, but also argues that it is fatally flawed, since it falters on the omission and pre-emption problems. Hanna attempts to defend the counterfactual comparative account of harm against both problems. In this paper, I argue that Hanna’s defence fails. I also show how his defence highlights the fact that (...) both the omission and the pre-emption problems have the same root cause – the inability of the counterfactual comparative account of harm to allow for our implicit considerations regarding well-being when assessing harm. While its purported neutrality with regard to substantive theories of well-being is one of the reasons that this account is considered to be the most plausible on offer, I will argue that this neutrality is illusory. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a new nonconceptual reading of the B-Deduction. As Hanna correctly remarks :399–415, 2011: 405), the word “cognition” has in both editions of the first Critique a wide sense, meaning nonconceptual cognition, and a narrow meaning, in Kant’s own words “an objective perception”. To be sure, Kant assumes the first meaning to account for why the Deduction is unavoidable. And if we take this meaning as a premise of the B-Deduction, then there is a gap (...) in the argument since the categories are certainly not conditions for non-conceptual cognition. Still, I believe it is not this wide meaning but rather the narrow one that figures in any premise of the B-Deduction. Thus, in the reading that I am proposing, categories are not conditions for representing something, or even conditions for representing something objectively. Instead, they are conditions for the recognition that what we represent through the senses exists mind-independently. In the first step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of the propositional thinking that the nonconceptually represented object of the sensible intuition exists objectively. In contrast, in the second step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of the apprehension of what our human senses represent nonconceptually as existing objectively. (shrink)